Foreword by Vairo, Georgene M.
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School




This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law
School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola
Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation





I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................... 516
II. RULE 11: A SUCCESSFUL OR FAILED EXPERIMENT
IN RULEMAKING? ..................................... . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . 519
A.Professor Paul D. Carrington & Attorney Andrew
Wasson-Rule 11: A Triumph of Rulemaking ..................... 519
B.Professor Carl Tobias-Rule I]: Setting a Bad Example
for Rulem aking ...................................................................... 520
III. Is RULE 11 WORKING AS INTENDED? ........................................ 522
A.Professor Charles Yablon-Rule 11 Is Alive and Working
W ell ....................................................................................... 522
B.Professor Danielle Kie Hart-The Aftermath of Rule 11:
Enhanced Use of Other Sanctioning Powers ........................ 525
C.Professor George Cochran-Can Judges Be Trusted with
Sanctions? ............................................................................. 528
D.Attorneys Jerold S. Solovy, Norman Hirsch, Margaret
Simpson & Christina T. Tomares-Nicely Done, But Case
Law Confusion Persists ........................................................ 530
IV. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RULE 11 AND THE REGULATION OF
LAWYERS- THE FUrU E .......................................................... 534
A.Professor Peter A. Joy-Rule 11: The Only Effective Tool
for Punishing Lawyers .......................................................... 535
B.Attorney Richard G. Johnson-Rule 11 's Future:
Enforcing the Model Rules of Professional Conduct ............ 538
V . CONCLUSION .............................................................................. 542
* Professor of Law & William M. Rains Fellow, Loyola Law School, Los
Angeles, California. My deepest gratitude extends to all of the authors in this
Symposium, to the staff of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review, and espe-
cially to Rick Johnson, for not only participating in the Symposium, but also
for his comments on this Foreword.
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:515
V I. A PPENDIX .................................................................................. 544
1937 VERSION OF RULE 11 WITH ADVISORY COMMITTEE
N OTE ......................................................................................... 544
1983 VERSION OF RULE 11 WITH ADVISORY COMMITTEE
N O TE ......................................................................................... 546
1987 VERSION OF RULE 11 WITH ADVISORY COMMITTEE
N O TE ......................................................................................... 55 1
1993 VERSION OF RULE 11 WITH ADVISORY COMMITTEE
N OTE ......................................................................................... 552
I. INTRODUCTION
Twenty years ago, just as I was beginning my career as a law
professor, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules of the Judicial
Conference of the Unites States gave birth to a new tool for dealing
with civil litigation abuse: Rule 11. A few months into my career,
just months before the 1983 amendments to Rule 11 would become
effective, Sol Schreiber, a former United States Magistrate Judge,
invited me to join the faculty for an American Law Institute-
American Bar Association Federal Practice program. He told me
that a new version of Rule 11 was about to become effective. He
wanted me to become THE expert on the rule and talk about it at the
program. To my embarrassment, I admitted to my ignorance about
the rule. He told me not to worry: nobody else had heard much, if
anything, about Rule 11 either, but the amendments would be very
controversial and would change federal practice forever. I agreed to
prepare a talk and have been writing about Rule 11 ever since.
As we all know, Sol was right. He was so right that Rule 11 is
still an important part of my academic efforts: the American Bar
Association's Center for Professional Responsibility as well as its
Tort, Trial & Insurance Practice Section have just co-published the
third edition of my 1,000 page, 5.2 pound treatise on the rule.' When
my non-lawyer friends see the treatise sitting on my coffee table (it
will be removed soon), they always ask me: "What's Rule 11?" To
lawyers, particularly federal litigators, the words "Rule 11
Sanctions" immediately conjure up very strong opinions about our
1. GEORGENE M. VAIRO, 2 RULE 11 SANCTIONS (Richard G. Johnson ed.,
3rd ed. 2004) [hereinafter VAIRO, RULE 11 SANCTIONS].
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system of civil justice: Too many frivolous lawsuits! Heavy-handed
judges! Chilling effective advocacy and novel claims! Rambo
lawyering! In a nutshell, I tell my non-lawyer friends that the rule
provides the courts with a way for dealing with frivolous litigation-
real or imagined,2 and I try to explain the controversy about the rule,
and why it is worth writing and continuing to think about.
Rule 11 became a metaphor for our civil justice system. The
debate took on a political flavor, and Rule 11 became an important
symbol or line in the sand: Will we have open courts? Or, will we
begin to shut the doors of the court to those perhaps most in need?
This Symposium is important because it provides a variety of reflec-
tions on the importance of the rule, and whether it is or can be a posi-
tive force in improving the administration of civil justice.
Parents are all-too-familiar with the "terrible twos," when their
cute little baby becomes a small version of the Terminator. And so it
was with Rule 11. Looking back, by 1985, two years after its birth,
Rule 11, although designed to become a tool for curbing abuse and
streamlining litigation, had became a tool of abuse in the opinion of
most commentators, including many of its early supporters.3 After
much ink was spilled, and after continued debate,4 ten years ago, a
2. Paul D. Carrington & Andrew Wasson, A Reflection on Rulemaking:
The Rule 11 Experience, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 563, 564 n.7 (2004) (question-
ing whether civil litigation abuse "was or is" a problem).
3. VAIRo, RULE 11 SANCTIONS, supra note 1, § 1.07. See, e.g., William
W Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, 101 HARv. L. REV. 1013, 1017-18 (1988)
(Judge Schwarzer, a well-known commentator on Rule 11, notes his support
for Rule 11 along with his acknowledgment of the Rule's shortcomings.).
4. VAIRo, RULE 11 SANCTIONS, supra note 1, at 2.
Major empirical studies, books and numerous law review articles were written
about practice under the 1983 version of Rule 11. Empirical studies include:
Report of the Comm. on Federal Courts: Sanctions and Attorneys' Fees (New
York State Bar Ass'n June 8, 1987); AM. JUDICATURE Soc'Y, RULE 11 IN
TRANSITION: THE REPORT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE ON FEDERAL
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 11, 75-77 (1989) [hereinafter THIRD CIRCUIT
TASK FORCE]; SAUL M. KASSIN, AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RULE 11
SANCTIONS (1985); JOHN SHAPARD ET AL., REPORT OF A SURVEY
CONCERNING RULE 11, FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (1995);
ELIZABETH C. WIGGINS & THOMAS E. WILLGING, RULE 11: FINAL REPORT TO
THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF
THE UNITED STATES (1991) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT]; THOMAS E.
WILLGING, THE RULE 11 SANCTIONING PROCESS 174-75 (1988) [hereinafter
FJC Study]; Lawrence C. Marshall et al., The Use and Impact of Rule 11, 86
NW. U. L. REv. 943, 943-49(1992); Melissa L. Nelken, The Impact of Federal
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grown-up version of Rule 11 was born.5
Although the literature spawned by Rule 11 in both its 1983 and
1993 incarnations has contributed to the thinning of various forests,
these anniversaries are a good time to reflect anew on the Rule 11
phenomenon. Has it grown up? Is it still going through growing
pains? What should Rule 11 look like by its thirtieth birthday?
Happily, I was able to persuade a distinguished cast of authors to
provide us with their thoughts about Rule 11 at the time of its
amendments' tenth and twentieth birthdays. Is it a "Happy
Birthday," or is Rule 11 still falling short of its goals and promises to
curb litigation abuse and streamline litigation without unnecessarily
chilling the assertion of novel claims or defenses? What can we ex-
pect from Rule 11 in the future? Can Rule 11 enhance
professionalism in the litigation arena and promote the
administration of justice?
The articles submitted explore these questions and more. Some
of our participants believe Rule 11, as it exists now, has largely
achieved its purposes. Others believe the 1983 version of Rule 11
was a cure worse than any disease. They worry, too, that Rule 11
has opened a Pandora's box: Although the 1993 amendments were
largely effective in rooting out some of the worst abuses of Rule 11
litigation, judges can and are using alternative sanctions tools in
Rule 11 on Lawyers and Judges in the Northern District of California, 74
JUDICATURE 147, 148-49 (1990); Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: A Critical
Analysis, 118 F.R.D. 189, 199-203 (1988) [hereinafter Vairo, Critical Analy-
sis]; Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: Where We Are and Where We Are Going, 60
FORDHAM L. REv. 475,478-87 (1991) [hereinafter Vairo, Where We Are].
It is fair to say that the debate about the 1983 version of Rule 11 prompted the
need for empirical study in the rulemaking process. Prior to that debate, the
Advisory Committee had not relied on empirical support for proposed rules
changes. See Thomas E. Willging, Past and Potential Uses of Empirical Re-
search in Civil Rulemaking, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1121, 1121-22 (2002)
[hereinafter Willging, Empirical Research] (the Advisory Committee was
criticized in the late 1980s for failing to have empirical support for the 1983
version of Rule 11). Notably, several of the authors contributing to this Sym-
posium undertook empirical analysis.
5. Communication from the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme
Court Transmitting Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
Forms, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2072, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 402. See also
VAIRO, RULE 11 SANCTIONS, supra note 1, § 1.08[e] (explaining the process
of amendments and hearings by the Advisory Committee and Judicial Confer-
ence leading up to the 1993 amendments to Rule 11).
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troubling ways. Finally, two of our authors offer a different vision of
Rule 11. In essence, they argue that Rule 11 can be reformed to
achieve the higher purpose of enforcing the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct. Below, I will offer my thoughts on Rule 11,
as I summarize and explain the importance of these articles.
II. RULE 11: A SUCCESSFUL OR FAILED EXPERIMENT
IN RULEMAKING?
A. Professor Paul D. Carrington & Attorney Andrew Wasson-
Rule 11: A Triumph of Rulemaking
The Symposium begins with "A Reflection on Rulemaking:
The Rule 11 Experience," 6 by Professor Paul D. Carrington and
attorney Andrew Wasson. Professor Carrington served as the
Reporter to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules in the years prior
to the 1993 amendments to Rule 11. 7 From his unique perspective as
a rule-maker, Professor Carrington, along with Mr. Wasson, explore
and describe the gestation, birth, and re-birth of Rule 11. More
provocatively, he and Mr. Wasson explain that the problems
engendered by Rule 11 stem from the challenge of rule-making
itself.
They argue that rule-makers face difficult problems. Rule-
makers must understand that their job is to create rules that will
effectuate the "command of substantive lawgivers who make
constitutions, statutes, and administrative rules to real events as best
they can be perceived."' This is a "very tall order" 9 necessitating
elastic rules that judges can tailor to achieve substantial justice.
However, such elasticity can lead judges and parties away from the
very goals underlying the substantive law. Even more troubling, the
procedures themselves may end up being used for various improper
purposes: "Alas, pity the poor procedural lawgivers whose work is
6. Carrington & Wasson, supra note 2.
7. Id. at 565 (explaining that the 1983 amendments to Rule 11 were a re-
sponse to the perception of some federal judges and corporate lawyers that the
principles of liberality and tolerance embedded in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure has created problems in need of a solution).
8. Id. at 563.
9. Id.
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forever the object of subversion by crafty professionals."' 10
The problems with the administration of the 1983 version of
Rule 11 have been well-documented. It was definitely subverted by
crafty professionals. Although Rule 11 intended the effect of cutting
down on some litigation misconduct, Rule 11 motion practice
became a problem of its own. Rule 11 became "something a good
procedure rule should not" ever become-"a celebrated issue.""
'
Despite the challenges facing rule-makers, Professor Carrington
and Mr. Wasson conclude that Rule 11, as it now exists, is an
example of successful rulemaking. "In its 1938 form, Rule 11
afforded no such shelter for judges inclined to deter abuse. In its
1983 form, perhaps it afforded too much. Possibly, at least for this
time and place, the 1993 version has it about right."'
2
In my view, Professor Carrington and Mr. Wasson are correct
that a good procedural rule should be "seen and not heard." Whether
they are correct that the 1993 amendments struck the right balance is
a theme discussed by the next article in this Symposium.
B. Professor Carl Tobias-Rule 11: Setting a Bad Example for
Rulemaking
The next article, "Rule 11 and Rule Revision,"'13 by Margaret L.
Sanner and Professor Carl Tobias, takes a more critical look at the
Rule 11 experience as well as rulemaking in general. In contrast to
Professor Carrington and Mr. Wasson, Ms. Sanner and Professor
Carl Tobias discuss the dangers of ad hoc rulemaking without the
benefit of empirical data. They argue that when rules are adopted
without due consideration of the reality of practice, unfortunate and
unintended consequences may result.' 4 Ms. Sanner and Professor
Tobias begin by reviewing the difficulties the 1983 version of Rule
11 presented for many plaintiffs' attorneys, particularly in the civil
rights arena, and the many articles and reports that chronicled the
problems with the administration of the rule.15 They then provide an
10. Id. at 564.
11. Id. at566.
12. Id. at 572.
13. Margaret L. Sanner & Carl Tobias, Rule 11 and Rule Revi-
sion,37_LoY. L.A. L. REV. 573 (2004).
14. Id. at 588-89.
15. Id. at 576, 577-80.
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overview of the 1993 Rule 11 amendment process and conclude with
several important recommendations.'
6
Ms. Sanner and Professor Tobias argue first that federal rule
makers should consider the frequency and number of amendments.
17
Second, they argue that the ninety-four federal district courts should
refrain from enacting local rules that conflict with the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.18 Third, they argue that the rule makers should
rely more on the Federal Judicial Center and other research arms for
empirical and analytical support. 19 Finally, they suggest that there
should be greater synergy between federal and state rule makers to
ensure greater uniformity and less confusion, where appropriate.20
According to Ms. Sanner and Professor Tobias, an important
lesson of the Rule 11 experience is that rulemaking based on anec-
dote rather than empirical data has detrimental consequences for
judges, parties, and lawyers, as well as for the rulemaking process
itself.21 They lament that rule makers have not learned from the Rule
11 experience, and that they are still using anecdotal evidence rather
than empirical data as the basis for modifying rules. For example,
the 1993 amendments to Rule 26 requiring immediate disclosure of
materials adverse to a party's interests shocked many members of the
bar. Many lawyers believed that requiring such disclosure without a
request from an adversary intruded fundamentally on the attorney-
client relationship and placed the attorney at odds with his or her
own client. The 1993 amendments to Rule 26 were made without
empirical support. These amendments became as controversial as
the 1983 version of Rule 11, prompting the need for further
amendments to tone down the more objectionable aspects of the
1993 disclosure amendments.
Ms. Sanner and Professor Tobias further demonstrate that the
volume of rulemaking changes, whether through the rules
amendment process or by Congress, over the last two decades or so
has undermined respect for the amendment process.22 For example,
16. Id. at 580-97.
17. Id. at 593-94.
18. Id. at 594-95.
19. Id. at 595.
20. Id. at 596-97.
21. Id. at 588.
22. Id. at 589-90.
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they argue that the Rule I I experience provided district judges a
prototype for doing what they wanted to do any way they wanted to,
rather than applying rules consistently. Thus, they note that many
judges now routinely follow their own rules rather than the mandated
rules in a number of areas. This, of course, as Ms. Sanner and
Professor Tobias correctly suggest, subverts the original purpose of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that there be a uniform federal
practice.
III. Is RULE 11 WORKING AS INTENDED?
A. Professor Charles Yablon-Rule 11 Is Alive and Working Well
Professor Charles Yablon's article, "Hindsight, Regret and Safe
Harbors in Rule 11 Litigation," 23 provides the empirical support for
Professor Carrington's and Mr. Wasson's claim that Rule 11 has
struck the correct balance. The article surveys the evidence that the
1993 amendments have been successful in substantially reducing
both frivolous litigation and abusive Rule 11 motions. Professor
Yablon describes the role that "hindsight and regret" have played in
that success. 24 The 1993 safe-harbor provision deprived Rule 11
movants of the powerful "hindsight effect" under which judges,
having just dismissed a case as non-meritorious, would be more
inclined to find that the claim should never have been brought in the
25first place. By decreasing hindsight bias, and by increasing the
ability of certain categories of litigants to act on their own feelings of
regret over having filed baseless or frivolous claims, the 1993
amendments protect access to the federal courts without increasing
frivolous filings, by facilitating an efficient resolution of allegations
of frivolous conduct.
Professor Yablon's article is important for a number of reasons.
First, he makes a strong case for the proposition that the 1993
version did get it right. He confirms, based on the existing evidence
and his own empirical analysis, that the volume of Rule 11 motions
has diminished significantly, which was an important goal of the
23. Charles Yablon, Hindsight, Regret and Safe Harbors in Rule 11 Litiga-
tion, 37 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 599 (2004).
24. Id. at 604-05, 608.
25. Id. at618-31.
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1993 Advisory Committee.26 More importantly, he argues that the
rule is equally as effective at deterring frivolous conduct as the 1983
version--even with the safe-harbor provision that Justice Scalia said
would render Rule 11 "toothless," when he dissented from the
adoption of the 1993 amendments.27 The reason is that although the
1993 amendments purported to maintain the same objective standard
for Rule 11 violations, in effect, the standard was changed in result to
a more objective one. Specifically, the safe-harbor provision has
made it more difficult for a Rule 11 movant to win a Rule 11 motion,
because the safe-harbor removes "hindsight bias, 28 which affected
how judges ruled on Rule 11 motions.
Of course, Professor Yablon is correct. However, it is also true
that hindsight bias is removed only if the paper is withdrawn. When
an attorney/litigant refuses to withdraw a filing, because of their
subjective belief in the merits, and the case is dismissed, the court is
forced to deal with the Rule 11 Motion. Arguably the court is apt to
be even more hindsight biased, once it considers that the
attorney/litigant had an opportunity to act after the Rule 11 notice,
but didn't do so.
Nonetheless, Professor Yablon makes an important contribution
to the legal scholarship in general-and about Rule 11 in
particular-through the use of cognitive bias theory. "[O]ne of the
most widespread and powerful of the behavioral heuristics
discovered by cognitive psychologists studying behavioral theory,"
29
"hindsight bias" is the "tendency of most people to view past events
as more probable than they really were.,, 30 Accordingly, when a
Rule 11 motion is decided at or after the time a judge considers the
merits of a claim that has also been attacked as frivolous, the judge
will have a tendency to engage in hindsight bias. If the judge
dismisses the claim, that additional information will make it more
likely that the judge will also find the claim to be frivolous.
Professor Yablon discusses a study that confirms this hypothesis,
which may be intuitive in result, but for which there was no previous
26. Id. at 614-15.
27. Id. at 611.
28. Id. at 618-31.
29. Id. at 621-22.
30. Id. at 622.
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data to support this common sense.3'
Having removed hindsight bias-but as I suggested above, pos-
sibly only in part-is only one of the improvements of the 1993
version of Rule 11. Professor Yablon also addresses the "toothless"
problem predicted by Justice Scalia and others: that frivolous filings
would increase, because the safe-harbor amendment would provide
abusive litigants with "one free pass" before having to worry about
being sanctioned. He provides a novel lexicon for different types of
litigators: 1) "tricksters"--litigators who know that their claim lacks
merit, but who think that they can hide the reality from their
adversaries in order to run up costs and promote settlement; 2) "Don
Quixotes"--litigators who maintain ideological or other positions
regardless of the current state of the law on. the subject;
3) "slackers"--litigators who are lazy or negligent, and who do not
care about the merits; and 4) "gamblers"--litigants who are
uncertain about the prospects of taking a particular position, but who
are willing to take long shots.32
He shows that the safe-harbor provision is sufficient to deal with
the slackers and gamblers. Once slackers are shown the error of their
positions, they are likely to withdraw. Similarly, a gambler is not
likely to take the economic risk of continuing to litigate once he or
she is called on the merits issue. Only "tricksters" and "Don
Quixotes" are likely to be undeterred by any form of Rule 11, and
such litigants, according to Professor Yablon, make up only a small
percentage of the litigators. Thus, he concludes, as did Professor
Carrington and Mr. Wasson, that Rule 11 has matured into an
effective tool for weeding out claims that ought not be in the federal
courts.
Without further empirical study, it is difficult to know whether
Professor Yablon is correct that only a small subset of lawyers are
likely to continue to be Rule 11 violators. His article suggests the
need for further cognitive and other research into the motivations of
attorneys. It is important to know who is truly abusing the judicial
process. Perhaps it is the case that Rule 11 is not capable of reaching
such conduct, but as the next two articles remind us, there are other
31. Id. at 22-23 (citing Baruch Fischhoff, Hindsight * Foresight: The Ef-
fect of Outcome Knowledge Under Uncertainty, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.
288, 289 (1975)).
32. Id. at 606-07.
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sanctions tools that courts can use to punish egregious conduct.
However, the authors of these articles also remind us that the use of
these tools, after the 1993 amendments to Rule 11, potentially at
least raise many of the same problems as the 1983 version of the
rule.
B. Professor Danielle Kie Hart-The Aftermath of Rule 11:
Enhanced Use of Other Sanctioning Powers
As the title to Professor Danielle Kie Hart's article, "And the
Chill Goes on-Federal Civil Rights Plaintiffs Beware: Rule 11
vis-A-vis 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and the Court's Inherent Power 33 sug-
gests, some of the problems associated with the use of the 1983
version of Rule 11 did not disappear with the 1993 amendments.
Professor Hart begins by exploring the standards for imposing
sanctions under Rule 11, section 1927 and the court's inherent
power.34 She then tests her hypothesis that the 1993 amendments
have led to more activity under section 1927 and the inherent power
authority by setting forth the results of her research on the sources of
sanctioning power after the 1993 amendments. 35 Her review of
reported cases shows that Rule 11 activity has decreased and that
alternate sanctioning activity has increased.36
More importantly, Professor Hart's examination of the text of
the decisions she surveyed shows that in many cases, the defendants
in civil rights cases have used the alternative devices because they
had failed to comply with the Rule 11 safe-harbor.37 In some of
these "sidestepping" cases, sanctions were imposed under these
alternative devices--even though the court suggested that the
violation was more akin to a Rule 11 violation than a bad-faith
violation, which is the standard under both section 1927 and the
court's inherent power. Professor Hart notes that much more
research needs to be done to confirm her preliminary findings. And,
one contribution of her article is to point out the need for empirical
33. Danielle Kie Hart, And the Chill Goes On-Federal Civil Rights Plain-
tiffs Beware: Rule 11 vis-a-vis 28 US.C. § 1927 and the Court's Inherent
Power, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 645 (2004).
34. Id. at 649-56.
35. Id. at 659-62.
36. Id. at 662.
37. Id. at 662-67.
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research to be done on this issue.
Professor Hart next discusses the implications of her research
that shows that alternative sanctioning activity has increased. The
key problem as she sees it is that sanction seekers are using section
1927 and the court's inherent power to "sidestep" the procedural
protections adopted in the 1993 amendments to Rule 11.38
Specifically, litigants who fail to comply with the safe-harbor
provision routinely seek sanctions under section 1927 or the court's
inherent power. According to Professor Hart, the problem is all the
more severe for the civil rights plaintiff. "Sidestepping" has the
further potential of eviscerating the 1993 amendments to Rule 11,
which she suggests were a step in the right direction.
Professor Hart recommends that courts refuse to impose
alternative sanctions when it is clear that the sanctions seeker is
trying to evade the safe-harbor. She also notes that the standard for
imposing sanctions under section 1927 and the court's inherent
power is higher, generally requiring bad faith, than the objective
standard of Rule 11. She recommends that the courts make sure that,
when imposing sanctions under section 1927 and the court's inherent
power, they scrupulously apply the higher substantive, generally
subjective standards for imposing such sanctions strictly.
It must be recalled that the purpose of the 1983 amendments was
to impress on the courts the duty to impose sanctions in appropriate
cases.39 It got the job done: instead of close to zero Rule 11 activity
in the years between 1938 and 1983, the federal courts decided
thousands of Rule 11 motions, prompting the need for the 1993
amendments. 40 It may have been difficult for many judges to have
imposed sanctions the first time, but once they realized the potency
of the tool, such reluctance faded. Now it seems that the sanctioning
consciousness continues to persist in other forms.
Professor Hart has expanded on my argument that the existence
of the safe-harbor provision has driven many sanctions seekers to
other sanctions tools. 41 Indeed, I added a chapter on alternative
sanctions devices to the 2004 third edition of my Rule 11 treatise,
38. Id. at 669-71.
39. VAiRO, RULE 11 SANCTIONS, supra note 1, at ch. 1.
40. See Georgene Vairo, Rule 11 and the Profession, 67 FORDHAM L. REV.
589, 598-99 (1998).
41. See id. at 689-90.
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because they have assumed such importance after the 1993
amendments to Rule 11.42
Professor Hart's article is important because she demonstrates
through her research what I have observed only anecdotally: While
the volume of sanctions activity under Rule 11 has diminished,
section 1927 and the court's inherent power activity has increased.
So, even if a civil rights plaintiff is now protected by the safe-harbor
provision, such litigants still need to fear sanctions motions, whether
the court imposes sanctions or not. While the year 2003 may well be
a Happy Birthday for Rule 11, it seems that Rule Il's rediscovered
siblings have yet to reach maturity.
One answer to the problems posed by Professor Hart would be
to adopt a bright line rule precluding use of section 1927 and the
court's inherent power sanctions, if Rule 11 would have been
applicable, but for the failure to follow the safe harbor. To the extent
that, as the Supreme Court in Chambers v. NASCO, Inc.,43 decided,
Rule 11 and the other sanctions tools reach different conduct,
adoption of such a rule may be problematic. Take, for example, the
case of one of Professor Yablon's "tricksters" or "gamblers." Is it
good policy to allow someone who has willfully sought to abuse the
judicial process to take advantage of an adversary's failure to comply
with the safe harbor when it is apparent that the trickster has acted in
bad faith? Clearly, Professor Hart is not worried about such a liti-
gant; rather she seeks to protect the civil rights lawyer who has
perhaps acted negligently, but certainly not in bad faith.
42. See VAIRO, RULE 11 SANcTIONs, supra note 1, at ch. 12 (Richard G.
Johnson ed., 3rd ed. 2004); Vairo, Rule 11 and the Profession, supra note 40,
at 643.
43. 501 U.S. 32 (1991). ("We discern no basis for holding that the sanc-
tioning scheme of the statute and the rules displaces the inherent power to im-
pose sanctions for the bad-faith conduct described above. These other mecha-
nisms, taken alone or together, are not substitutes for the inherent power, for
that power is both broader and narrower than other means of imposing sanc-
tions. First, whereas each of the other mechanisms reaches only certain indi-
viduals or conduct, the inherent power extends to a full range of litigation
abuses. At the very least, the inherent power must continue to exist to fill in the
interstices.").
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C. Professor George Cochran-Can Judges Be Trusted with
Sanctions?
Professor George Cochran's article, "The Reality of 'A Last
Victim' and Abuse of the Sanctioning Power," picks up, in a
dramatic way, on the problem identified by Professor Hart that courts
may be tempted to use alternative sanctions devices when the party
seeking Rule 11 sanctions has failed to comply with its procedural
requirements theme in a dramatic way.44 Professor Cochran agrees
with Professor Hart that the 1993 version of Rule 11 is an
improvement. However, he warns about the potential for the abuse
of power of federal judges by telling the story of the impeachment of
United States District Court Judge Robert Peck in the aftermath of
land disputes following the Louisiana Purchase some two centuries
ago.
45
In that story, Judge Peck had ruled against a lawyer in one
politically charged case involving back-dated land grants in
Missouri. After Judge Peck had issued his opinion and had sought to
attach the land in question, the attorney, Luke Lawless, wrote an
anonymous article in the newspaper excoriating Judge Peck for his
opinion. Judge Peck held Lawless in contempt. Lawless then took
Judge Peck to task by filing a letter seeking Judge Peck's
impeachment in the United States House of Representatives. The
House voted to impeach by a huge majority on the ground that Judge
Peck had engaged in tyranny, and that he had violated the First
Amendment, among other things. Judge Peck escaped conviction in
the United States Senate by only one vote. In the wake of the
impeachment proceedings, Congress enacted the first laws governing
the federal court's contempt power.
Of course, Lawless was not a perfect "victim" himself. His
conduct may well have violated the ABA Code of Professional
Responsibly as well as its successor Model Rules of Professional
Conduct. The question, however, is abuse of judicial power. The
question of the extent to which attorneys may criticize judges is an
important one, clearly implicating First Amendment concerns. Even
if Lawless stepped over some boundaries, the question is whether
44. George Cochran, The Reality of "A Last Victim" and Abuse of the
Sanctioning Power, 37 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 691 (2004) [hereinafter Cochran].
45. Id. at 695-700.
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Judge Peck overreacted with his awesome power as a judge.
Why tell the story of Judge Peck's impeachment? When
Congress enacted the contempt laws, it was seeking to ensure that
Luke Lawless would be the "Last Victim" of abusive judicial power.
Thus, just as Judge Peck had held Lawless in contempt to "keep the
streams of justice clear and pure, ' 46 the purpose of the 1983
amendments to Rule 11 was to "streamline the litigation process by
lessening frivolous claims or defenses, ' 7 and this purpose was
maintained in the 1993 amendments. In the early days of the 1983
amendments, one commentator noted that there are judges who act
very arbitrarily, have biases, and who seek to 'get' particular
lawyers; 48 '[a]nd boy, Rule 11 is some tool to do it with.' 49 So,
somewhat ironically, Congress revested within the Judiciary the
ability to abuse its power through the Rule 11 sanctioning process.
Luke Lawless, reprehensible though he may have been, was not
the "Last Victim" of the abuse of judicial power. Professor Cochran
continues by telling the story of the sanctioning of Professor Barry
Nakell.5 ° Professor Nakell was also involved in a politically charged
case. He was on the losing end of the merits, and he too became the
object of a federal district judge's wrath in a highly publicized case.
In that case, the court imposed substantial sanctions upon him, most
of which were vacated on appeal. The Rule 11 violation finding,
however, was not disturbed, and Professor Nakell's professional and
personal life became a nightmare. The Dean of his law school as
well as his Rabbi noted the powerful effects the case had on him.
His psychological distress led to a shoplifting charge to which he
pled guilty. He was suspended by the bar, and he lost his teaching
position-despite years of nothing but exemplary comments about
his performance.
According to Professor Cochran, the moral of the story is that
the 1993 amendments to Rule 11 have been a step in the right
46. Id. at 698 (Quoting ARTHUR J. STANSBURY, REPORT OF THE TRIAL OF
JAMES H. PECK 36 (1833)).
47. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note to 1983 amendment.
48. Cochran, supra note 44, at 110 (quoting Melvyn I. Weiss, A Prac-
tioner's Commentary on the Actual Use of Amended Rule 11, 54 FoRDAM L.
REv. 23, 26 (1985).
49. Id. at 700.
50. Id. at 700-708.
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direction. 5 The safe-harbor should ensure that Professor Nakell is
the "Last Victim" of Rule 11. Had the safe-harbor been in effect for
him, the district court judge in the case Professor Nakell had brought
would have lacked the power to impose monetary sanctions on him,
because he had sought to withdraw the case, when it had become
clear the claims were not sustainable.52
Professor Cochran, however, notes that being the last victim of
Rule 11 does not ensure that Professor Nakell is the last victim of
abusive sanctioning power. 3 He surveys the case law under section
1927 and the court's inherent power, and he concludes it is
necessary for the federal courts to ensure such tools be used only
when bad faith is clear. Not all the federal circuits are as strict in
construing such tools as they should be. More importantly, it is
difficult to remove all bias from all federal judges. Thus, it is
unlikely that we have seen the last victim of sanctions abuse.
As an aside, Professor Cochran and I worked together pro bono
during the 1980's on several Rule 11 cases. One such case involved
a young attorney in a civil rights case. We were successful in having
the sanctions that had been imposed on her vacated. I thought it
would be useful to have her perspectives as a part of this
Symposium. Thanks to the internet, I was able to track her down. I
was delighted to see that in the ensuing years, she had accomplished
much in her career, and that she had engaged in significant public
service as well. Despite her exoneration and all these
accomplishments, the whole Rule 11 experience had been so painful
to her that she declined to participate here. Professor Cochran's
article is therefore all the more important, because, as always, he
reminds us that it is real people, who cannot always speak for
themselves, that are affected by abuses of sanctioning authority.
D. Attorneys Jerold S. Solovy, Norman Hirsch, Margaret Simpson &
Christina T. Tomares-Nicely Done, But Case Law
Confusion Persists
On a general level, each of the articles discussed above are
generally positive about the benefits of the 1993 version of Rule 11.
51. Id. at 708-09.
52. Id. at 708-13.
53. Id. at 713-19.
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Professors Hart and Cochran remind us, though, to beware of other
sources of sanctioning authority, which have become more important
in the wake of the 1993 amendments to Rule 11. But, what of the
actual operation of Rule 11? How are the courts interpreting the new
provisions? Are there any particular trouble spots? "Sanctions
Under Rule 11: A Cross-Circuit Comparison," by attorneys Jerold S.
Solovy, Norman Hirsch, Margaret Simpson, and Christina T.
Tomares provides answers to some of these questions.
54
The article begins by noting that, while Rule 11 has been
designed to strike a balance between reducing frivolous claims and
preserving fair access to courts, the various federal courts of appeals
have approached Rule 11, and implicitly such balancing, in different
ways in two key areas: 1) when a paper can be sanctioned for an
improper purpose; and 2) how courts determine whether to impose
sanctions, including the standard applied and the implementation of
the safe-harbor procedures.
5 5
With respect to the improper purpose problem, the article
surveys two key issues. First, it explores the meaning of an improper
purpose.5 6 What improper purposes subject a litigant to sanctions?
Only those enumerated in the rule, itself, or others? A key problem
here is whether the phrase "any improper purpose" encompasses the
filing of a paper that is colorable as a matter of fact and law, but
which has been filed to harass an adversary. Can such a paper be
said to be filed for an improper purpose? The article notes that
complaints are often filed for multiple purposes, including,
sometimes, an improper purpose. The article shows that the courts
of appeals are taking divergent positions with respect to many of
these issues. For example, even though all courts agree the Rule 11
test is objective, they disagree as to whether state of mind can be
considered as part of an objective analysis. The article argues that
subjective purposes should be ignored.
5 7
The next problem tackled is whether filing a complaint, when
one purpose is to create bad publicity for an adversary, is conduct
sanctionable under the improper purpose clause. The article reviews
54. Jerold S. Solovy et al., Sanctions Under Rule 11: A Cross-Circuit Com-
parison, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 727 (2004) [hereinafter Solovy].
55. Id. at 727.
56. Id. at 727-29.
57. Id. at 731-32.
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a recent en banc Fifth Circuit opinion that concluded a filing
designed to embarrass Kmart was sanctionable conduct.58 The test in
the Fifth Circuit for a mixed purpose case is that sanctions may be
imposed only under unusual circumstances. Relying on rather sparse
district court findings, the en banc opinion, over a strenuous dissent,
reinstated sanctions.
On the other hand, the article points out that the Second Circuit
vacated sanctions in a case in which a plaintiff had filed a complaint
in New York against defendants, who were pursuing claims against
him in Israel in order to obtain leverage in the Israeli case.59 The
Second Circuit quite clearly would not have imposed sanctions under
the facts of the Fifth Circuit case. One is reminded of the "Last
Victim" point made by Professor Cochran. Did the lawyer in the
Fifth Circuit case enrage the court as Judge Peck had been earlier
enraged, and therefore become a victim of his flamboyant publicity
stunt?
Another improper purpose problem is whether a complaint may
ever be sanctioned for an improper purpose on the ground that the
complainant has a right to petition the government. Although the
article takes no position on this problem, it makes plain that courts
ought to tread lightly to protect any First Amendment rights
implicated by a complaint seeking redress from the courts.
Additionally, the paper argues that any paper that is legally and
factually sound should not be sanctioned under the improper purpose
clause.
60
The article then turns to a discussion of the safeguards afforded
to targets of Rule 11 sanctions.61  Rule 11 affords courts the
opportunity to impose non-monetary sanctions sua sponte. However,
the court must issue an order to show cause that provides the target
with the opportunity to be heard. The article reviews the approach of
the courts in determining when it is appropriate for sanctions to be
imposed sua sponte. It concludes that courts ought to use due care in
imposing such sanctions, and they ought not impose such sanctions
58. Id. at 733-34 (citing Whitehead v. Food Max of Miss., Inc., 332 F.3d
796 (5th Cir. 2003) (en banc)).
59. Id. at 734-36 (citing Sussman v. Bank of Isr., 56 F.3d 450 (2d Cir.
1995).
60. Id. at 745.
61. Id. at 745-55.
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in less than egregious cases. It rejects the idea, however, that a
subjective bad-faith standard ought to be applied as the Second
Circuit held in the recent In re Pennie & Edmonds, LLP62 case. And,
it appears that the Eleventh Circuit is inclined to follow their
recommendation.
63
When a party initiates sanctions, it must comply with the
safe-harbor requirement. The article shows that most courts enforce
the safe-harbor strictly, as they should, but there are some signs that
some courts of appeals are incorrectly loosening the technical
requirements. 64 Instead of treating the safe-harbor requirement as
jurisdictional in nature, some courts are, unfortunately, according to
the authors, moving to a waiver model of enforcement. For example,
the Fourth Circuit excused a lack of compliance, when the target
failed to raise the safe-harbor issue until appeal, finding the
safe-harbor was not a jurisdictional requirement. 65 The Seventh
Circuit also has a more flexible approach to compliance with the
safe-harbor.66
The article concludes by returning to the balancing theme. It
argues, correctly in my view, that court of appeals splits should be
resolved in favor of protecting fair access to the courts rather than, as
the Seventh Circuit generally would have it, by promoting the
streamlining of litigation.67 It also suggests the Advisory Committee
tackle the First Amendment issue implicit in the improper purpose
cases involving complaints.
The "Cross-Circuit Comparison" article is important because it
gives us a snapshot of the current version of Rule 11 at the age of
twenty. It confirms the essential position of all of our commentators
that Rule 11-as it now exists-is maturing, and that the balance
should be struck in favor of protecting fair access to courts without
undue fear of sanctions. However, the article's snapshot shows that
62. 323 F.3d 86 (2d Cir. 2003), vacating Patsy's Brand, Inc. v. I.O.B. Re-
alty, Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 491 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
63. See Solovy, supra note 54, at 754 (citing Kaplan v. DaimlerChrysler,
331 F.3d 1251, 1255 (11th Cir. 2003)).
64. Id. at 755-62.
65. See id. at 757-58 (citing Rector v. Approved Fed. Say. Bank, 265 F.3d
248, 253 (4th Cir. 2001)).
66. See id. at 760-62 (citing Divane v. Krull Elec. Co., 200 F.3d 1020,
1027-28 (7th Cir. 1999)).
67. See id. at 762-63.
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not all of the excesses of adolescence have been eliminated. There is
room for courts to improve on interpreting Rule 11, as well as
alternative sanctions tools, to ensure that there are no more "Last
Victims."
IV. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RULE 11 AND THE REGULATION OF
LAWYERS-THE FUTURE
What about the future? Does Rule 11 have room to mature
further? The next two articles explore an often overlooked aspect of
Rule 11-the relationship between Rule 11 and the regulation of
lawyers. When the initial furor over the 1983 version of Rule 11
erupted, and when the first Symposium about the rule was held at the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York, United States
District Court Judge Thomas Duffy posed a question to the audience,
which to paraphrase him was: "What is it with you guys? You
complained and complained that the organized bar was not taking
care of your bad guys, so you lobbied for a rule; now that you have
it, you complain and complain.',68  In other words, Rule 11 was
designed in part as a tool to discipline lawyers. It was the only
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure that governed attorney ethical
conduct per se.
There were two key problems with Rule 11 as originally enacted
in 1938. First, Rule 1 l's certification provisions were "not read
enough, not demanding enough and not honored enough. 69 Second,
the sanctions provision was rarely invoked, and the kind of sanction
that could be imposed was open to question.70
Nevertheless, Rule 11 was the only Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure specifically governing attorney ethical conduct.
Accordingly, it seemed to be the appropriate vehicle for making
lawyers act more responsibly to the court.71 Thus, in 1983, Rule I I's
68. See Symposium, Amended Rule 11 Of The Federal Rules Of Civil Pro-
cedure: How Go The Best Laid Plans?, 54 FORDHAM L. REv 1, 20 (1985)
(Remarks of Kevin Thomas Duffy, U.S.D.J., S.D.N.Y.).
69. Arthur R. Miller & Diana G. Culp, Federal Practice: Litigation Costs,
Delay Prompted the New Rule of Civil Procedure, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 28, 1983,
at 24.
70. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note to 1983 amendment,
reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 199 (1983).
71. See Miller & Culp, supra note 69, at 10-11 (discussing the 1983
amendments to Rule 11, emphasizing the need to "try and engineer improved
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certification provision was substantially revised in an attempt to
clarify what an attorney must do before filing a litigation document,
and the sanctions provision was amended to provide for mandatory
sanctions, which may include a reasonable attorney's fee.72 The
1993 version of the rule clarified these ethical requirements, such as
the "later advocating" provision, while changing the procedures
under the rule, and providing that sanctions are no longer mandatory.
Professor Peter A. Joy 3 and attorney Richard G. Johnson's 74
articles remind us that the language of Rule 11 and the rules of
professional conduct governing attorneys are essentially the same.
These articles make two important points that may suggest the future
direction of Rule 11. First, Professor Joy's extensive empirical
analysis shows that Rule 11, as opposed to formal bar discipline, has
been the only effective tool for punishing lawyers who have engaged
in litigation misconduct. Second, in perhaps the most provocative
piece of this Symposium, Mr. Johnson, who is the editor of my Rule
11 treatise, argues that the scope of Rule 11 should be expanded to
encompass all forms of unprofessional behavior under the rules of
professional conduct. He takes the implications of Professor Joy's
fimdings, that judges are better at enforcing rules of conduct than is
the organized bar, and he suggests modifications to Rule 11 that
would make it the tool for enforcing all of the Rules of Professional
Conduct, not just those ethical rules that parrot the language of Rule
11.
A. Professor Peter A. Joy--Rule 11: The Only Effective Tool for
Punishing Lawyers
In his article, "The Relationship Between Civil Rule 11 and
Lawyer Discipline: An Empirical Analysis Suggesting Institutional
Choices in the Regulation of Lawyers," Professor Joy's exploration
or increased lawyer responsibility" and "moderate lawyer behavior in litiga-
tion).
72. FED. R. CIv. P. 11 advisory committee's note to 1983 amendment, re-
printed in 97 F.R.D. 165, 200 (1983).
73. Peter A. Joy, The Relationship Between Civil Rule 11 and Lawyer Dis-
cipline: An Empiricle Analysis Suggesting Institutional Choices in the Regula-
tion of Lawyers, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 765 (2004).
74. Richard G. Johnson, Integrating Legal Ethics & Professional Responsi-
bility with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 819
(2004).
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of the correlation between Rule 11 and professional discipline begins
with the 1993 Advisory Committee Note, which suggested that a
possible non-monetary sanction under Rule 11 may be "referring the
matter to disciplinary authorities. 75  In the wake of the 1993
amendments, some commentators suggested that more disciplinary
referrals ought to be made based upon Rule 11 proceedings. 76 Thus,
Professor Joy asks two questions: 1) is there empirical evidence to
suggest that there is a relationship between Rule 11 and disciplinary
proceedings; and 2) should lawyers be disciplined for conduct that is
subject to Rule 11 sanctions.
Professor Joy begins by exploring how Rule 11 fits within the
overall scheme for lawyer regulation.77 A complex system of
different institutions comprise the regulatory scheme for lawyers.
One such institution is the courts' enforcement of lawyer norms
through the judicial process in actions ranging from legal malpractice
and fee disputes to sanctions under Rule 11 or other devices.
Another institution is the organized bar, whether through bar
associations or the state supreme courts that set forth regulations
governing attorney conduct. Private institutions also play a role.
Journalists write about lawyers; clients exert pressures; the legal
marketplace regarding fees and other matters play a role, and so
forth. Legislatures also impact attorney conduct.
One need look no further than the furor over the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act to see how lawyers react when Congress seeks to assert authority
over lawyers and their respective duties to clients and courts. "The
institutional constraints on lawyers' conduct converge with ethics
rules promulgated by the bar, disciplinary systems involving the bar
and state supreme courts, trial courts through their inherent powers,
statutes, and rules of procedure such as Rule 11.,,78
Professor Joy continues by comparing the modes of enforcement
of the similar standards proscribing litigation abuse by disciplinary
75. Joy, supra note 73, at 766 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory commit-
tee's note to 1993 amendment, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 401, 587 (1993).
76. Id. (citing Lonnie T. Brown, Jr., Ending Illegitimate Advocacy: Rein-
vigorating Rule 11 Through Enhancement of the Ethical Duty to Report, 62
OHIO ST. L.J. 1555 (2001); Jeffrey A. Parness, Disciplinary Referrals Under
New Federal Civil Rule 11, 61 TENN. L. REv. 37 (1993)).
77. Id. at 768-85.
78. Id. at 768-69.
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institutions on the one hand, and courts through sanctions tools on
the other. This review leads Professor Joy to conclude that Rule 11
sanctions have a distinct advantage over professional discipline,
because courts can more easily identify, correct, and control
litigation misconduct that takes place before them in a timely
fashion. Because Rule 11 and the rules of professional conduct
enforce similar standards, and because the Advisory Committee
suggested referral to disciplinary authorities as a sanction, he
examined the extent to which the federal courts were imposing such
a sanction, but he found that such referrals were rare.
Despite the acknowledged limitations of conducting electronic
database research on the incidence of sanctions, it is clear that the
data does "tell a story" about the relationship between Rule 11
sanctions and professional discipline for the same conduct. 79 An
exhaustive analysis of the cases showed the overall volume of Rule
11 cases since the adoption of the 1993 version of Rule 11. This
analysis confirms the research of Professor Hart that the volume of
Rule 11 activity diminished after 1993. Nonetheless, over 2,000
cases were reported. Out of that group of cases, however, only fifty-
one involved any discussion of discipline, and only four of these
actually involved the imposition of a sanction of referral for
professional discipline. Moreover, in the 444 cases in which the
federal courts had imposed sanctions, Professor Joy found that the
lawyer was sanctioned in a public disciplinary proceeding in only
twenty-two of the cases, and in only three of the cases was the
lawyer sanctioned for the same misconduct that gave rise to the Rule
11 violation. Thus, Professor Joy concludes, there is very little
correlation between Rule 11 sanctions and state disciplinary
proceedings.80
He then turns to the normative question: notwithstanding the
lack of a correlation, should there be a relationship?81 He begins his
analysis by noting the similarity of the text of Rule 11 and Model
Rule 3.1. He then takes a look at Model Rule 8.3, which governs
when an attorney has a duty to report attorney misconduct. His
analysis suggests that it is questionable whether Model Rule 8.3
79. Id. at 789.
80. Id. at 797.
81. Id. at 797-806.
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provides the link to a higher correlation between Rule 11 and
professional discipline. He argues that the bias against mandatory
reporting is similar to the 1993 amendment that makes the
sanctioning of attorneys discretionary, even if there is a Rule 11
violation.
He concludes by arguing that for the most part there ought not to
be more of a correlation between Rule 11 and professional
discipline.82 Harkening back to the division of labor discussed at the
beginning of his article in terms of the various institutions that
regulate attorney conduct, he suggests that attorney disciplinary
authorities are unable or unwilling to control litigation misconduct,
but that trial judges are in a unique position to do so. He
persuasively demonstrates that disciplinary authorities have shown
themselves to be relatively impotent in dealing with litigation abuse.
In contrast, trial judges have shown themselves to be quite proficient
at it. Accordingly, Professor Joy would leave it to the federal courts
to continue to control abusive litigation conduct through Rule 11,
especially because disciplinary authorities have failed to do the job.
As we all know, the legal profession does not stand in good
stead in the public at large. While the problem of abusive litigation
tactics and frivolous filings has been overstated by some, the public
needs to be assured that the profession one way or the other punishes
bad lawyers. As we have seen, however, using Rule 11 as the
solution of all evils is problematic. Moreover, the debate in the
famous Golden Eagle case8 3 shows the federal courts are not happy
about using the rule to enforce professional discipline.
84
B. Attorney Richard G. Johnson-Rule 11 's Future: Enforcing the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct
In his article, "Integrating Legal Ethics & Professional
82. Id. at 806-14.
83. Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531 (9th
Cir. 1986).
84. The district court had imposed sanctions on a law firm because it had
violated a "duty of candor" that the district court had read into Rule 1 1-the
firm had argued that its legal position was based on existing law when in fact
the legal position was based on an argument to change existing law. When re-
versing the district court, the Ninth Circuit opined that the district court's duty
of candor undesirably would require the courts to enforce standards of conduct.
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Responsibility with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11,85 attorney
Richard G. Johnson agrees with Professor Joy's conclusion that
federal court enforcement of Rule 11 is the most appropriate vehicle
for controlling litigation abuse, which otherwise could be punished
by state disciplinary authorities. He too notes the disconnect
between Rule 11 and the enforcement of litigation norms by
disciplinary authorities. Like Professor Joy, he believes Rule 11 is
an effective tool for combating attorney misconduct. But he argues
that legal ethics and professional responsibility norms ought to be
further integrated with the enforcement of Rule 11 as a key part of
attorney regulation.
Mr. Johnson's article is an important contribution to the Rule 11
literature in general, and with respect to the argument that Rule 11
and professional ethics norms be further integrated, specifically,
because he successfully uses the courts' and the commentators' own
words to demonstrate the key issues. The language of Rule 11 is
important, because it sets the tone and the parameters for what is
acceptable conduct and what is not. As such, Mr. Johnson uses
extensive quotes to illustrate the nuances of how the courts and
commentators have generally side-stepped the legal ethics and
professional responsibility rules that are binding upon lawyers, when
determining Rule 11 issues. In over 8,000 Rule 11 opinions to date,
the courts have discussed the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
in less than 0.5% of them, which is amazing in the proverbial sense
of missing the forest for the trees.
The article begins with a discussion of how the text of Rule 11
came to be.86 It shows how the precepts of Rule 11 evolved out of
the same litigation context as the efforts to adopt the Model Rules.
On all fronts, whether the ABA or the Judicial Conference, there
were concerns about the rise of abusive litigation. Rule 11, in
essence, became the bridge between legal ethics and litigation
conduct. Mr. Johnson then surveys the Rule 11 case law to
demonstrate how the federal courts missed the opportunity to create a
lasting bridge. He shows how the courts tended to interpret Rule 11
as incorporating a negligence standard of care as opposed to a code
of conduct. Moreover, he shows that the federal courts, in
85. Johnson, supra note 74, at 819.
86. Id. at 819-32.
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interpreting Rule 11, were reinventing the wheel, when all they had
to do was look to Model Rules for guidance.
Mr. Johnson provides an exhaustive analysis of the relevant
disciplinary rules, and the impact that those rules have had on Rule
11. He criticizes the refusal of the ABA to sanction (pun intended)
the courts to use Rule 11 to enforce the Model Rules, and then argues
that such rules ought to provide the standards for applying Rule 11.
He demonstrates that much time was wasted in construing Rule 11
and amending it, with respect to matters such as the duty of candor,
or the "later advocating" provision, and whether the Rule 11 standard
on frivolousness is an objective one, for example. If the courts had
adopted the Model Rule approaches on such topics, these would not
have proven to be such tough issues.
He further proposes amendments to Rule 11 to integrate it with
the rules of professional conduct, and he concludes by arguing that
the courts ought to enforce such rules of conduct through Rule 11 as
the enforcement vehicle.87 Such integration will have the salutary
effects of reducing the confusion implicit in having multiple systems
for enforcing essentially the same norms. Moreover, even within the
courts, using Rule 11 to enforce all professional rules governing
litigation misconduct would obviate the need for multiple federal
sources of sanctioning power, which feeds back into the warnings of
Professors Hart and Cochran regarding the efforts to side-step the
Rule I l's safe-harbor by turning to other, more stringent sanctions
mechanisms, such as section 1927 and the court's inherent power.
To effectuate his vision, Mr. Johnson proposes amending Rule
11 to expressly incorporate violations of the Model Rules or other
state ethics rules as the basis for violating Rule 11. He concludes by
arguing that the courts' refusal to enforce all ethical norms has been
a major factor in the public's poor perception of the legal profession.
In my view, while the profession has done much of late to tame
the excesses of practice, lawyers remain a target for reform efforts to
a great extent because of their propensity to seek to maximize their
legal fees in situations that may not be well-justified. For instance,
by the time that this Symposium is published, Congress may have
passed the Class Action Fairness Act, which targets what some
believe are the filing of abusive class action lawsuits in state courts
87. Id. at 907-15.
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to extort huge settlements from corporate defendants. The key
perceived culprits here are the so-called coupon cases, where the
plaintiffs receive little or nothing and the plaintiffs' attorneys receive
millions of dollars.
Undoubtedly, some of the state court filings are appropriate, and
notwithstanding the value to individual plaintiffs, they may serve a
deterrent purpose; but there is at least a perception that these cases
are brought essentially for the purpose of enriching the lawyers who
bring them. Such conduct may violate the Model Rules--even when
the merits of the case are not frivolous. Where is the consideration
for the client? How can any significant legal fee be due and owing to
the lawyers if they bring essentially no value to the client? In these
situations, by redefining the client to be the class-and not the
individuals-such lawyers can claim an aggregated benefit to the
individuals in the class. Clearly, on an individual basis, no
reasonable contingency lawyer would bring a hundred dollar or less
case, yet that is what these coupon cases amount to, and the lawyers
then make and receive fee applications sometimes in the seven-to-
eight-to-even-nine-figure range. Is such conduct unethical? If so, is
it ethical for such attorneys to receive such fees?
As such, Mr. Johnson's conception of Rule 11, as being the
other side of the coin of legal ethics and professional responsibility
would have a profound impact. Congress would not have to enact
laws regarding such class action cases if the legal ethics and
professional responsibility rules regarding reasonable fees were
incorporated into Rule 11 just as is the prohibition against frivolous
conduct. It is no understatement to say that if these two worlds were
to collide, the courts, the lawyers, the parties, and the public may all
by and large be better off, because there would be a consistent and
unified playing field of what is right and wrong in the litigation
context, at least in the federal courts.
A further question that must be explored, however, is whether it
is appropriate for the federal courts, through Rule 11, to become the
arbiters of rules of professional conduct. Currently, we look to each
of the states to enforce their rules of conduct. Additionally, choice of
law questions abound. Under the Erie doctrine, 8 would or should
the federal court incorporate the professional conduct rules of the
88. Erie RR v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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state in which the federal court sits? Or, should the federal courts be
free to adopt their own visions of how to use Rule 11 to enforce the
standards in the Model Code? Finally, because Rule 11 does not in
itself provide a cause of action, the only conduct that it can reach is
that which arises in the context of litigation. So, professional
conduct violations arising in transactional matters would seem
largely to be beyond the reach of Rule 11, unless, somehow,
incorporated into a legal malpractice cause of action.
Mr. Johnson's argument deserves careful thought. Professor Joy
has demonstrated that Rule 11 is the most effective tool for enforcing
rules of conduct. If the legal profession is serious about improving
standards of conduct and improving the public's perception about the
profession, Mr. Johnson's article should be explored seriously.
V. CONCLUSION
So, Happy Birthday Rule 11! You have grown up and are doing
just fine. But, now that you are close to the age of graduating from
college, it is time to get on with the real work. Mr. Johnson is
absolutely correct that a more effective tool needs to be developed to
deal with abusive litigation that includes improper dealings with
clients or neglect for the clients' true interests, not to mention those
of opposing parties. Of course, the problem remains: Who gets to
determine whether the litigation is abusive, or whether the client's
real interests have been served? And, as Professors Tobias, Hart, and
Cochran have shown, the judiciary cannot always be counted upon to
apply the rules as well as they should. But, as Professor Joy has
demonstrated, Rule 11 appears to be the best tool available for
enforcing the rules of professional conduct. And, Professors
Carrington, Yablon, and attorneys Wasson, Solovy, Hirsh, Simpson,
and Tomares have demonstrated that, by and large, after the 1993
amendments to Rule 11, courts are striking the balance just about
right.
This Symposium's authors have provided plenty of food for
thought. Rule 11 has served as a metaphor for the debates about the
problems in the profession. It is likely to continue to do so. Quite
clearly, now as always, there will be lawyers-be they tricksters or
not-who will act in problematic ways. This Symposium tells us
that Rule 11 as currently drafted is working pretty well.
Nonetheless, questions remain: What about the migration to other
Winter 2004] FOREWORD 543
sanctions rules? Are such tools being overused? Or, should Rule 11
be taken further to get at broader ranges of unethical conduct?
Would such an expansion lead to even greater problems, or finally to
enhanced administration of civil justice in the federal courts? Stay
tuned!
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VI. APPENDIX-FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 11
WITH ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTES 1937-1993
A. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (1937) (Signing of Pleadings)
Every pleading of a party represented by an attorney shall be
signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual name,
whose address shall be stated. A party who is not represented by an
attorney shall sign his pleading and state his address. Except when
otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need
not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. The rule in equity that
the averments of an answer under oath must be overcome by the
testimony of two witnesses or of one witness sustained by
corroborating circumstances is abolished. The signature of an
attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading;
that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief there is
good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay. If
a pleading is not signed or is signed with intent to defeat the purpose
of this rule, it may be stricken as sham and false and the action may
proceed as though the pleading had not been served. For a wilful
violation of this rule an attorney may be subjected to appropriate
disciplinary action. Similar action may be taken if scandalous or
indecent matter is inserted.
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE
1937 Adoption
This is substantially the content of former Equity Rules 24
(Signature of Counsel) and 21 (Scandal and Impertinence)
consolidated and unified. Compare former Equity Rule 36 (Officers
Before Whom Pleadings Verified). Compare to similar purposes,
English Rules Under the Judicature Act (The Annual Practice, 1937)
0. 19, r. 4, and Great Australian Gold Mining Co. v. Martin, L.R. 5
Ch. Div. 1, 10 (1877). Subscription of pleadings is required in many
codes. 2 Minn. Stat. (Mason, 1927) § 9265; N.Y.R.C.P. (1937) Rule
91; 2 N.D.Comp.Laws Ann. (1913) § 7455.
This rule expressly continues any statute which requires a
pleading to be verified or accompanied by an affidavit, such as:
U.S.C., Title 28:
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§ 381 [former] (Preliminary injunctions and temporary
restraining orders)
§ 762 [now § 1402] (Suit against the United States)
U.S.C., Title 28, § 829 [now § 1927] (Costs; attorney liable for,
when) is unaffected by this rule.
For complaints which must be verified under these rules, see
Rules 23(b) (Secondary Action by Shareholders) and 65
(Injunctions).
For abolition of the rule in equity that the averments of an
answer under oath must be overcome by the testimony of two
witnesses or of one witness sustained by corroborating
circumstances, see 12 P.S.Pa. § 1222; for the rule in equity itself, see
Greenfield v. Blumenthal, C.C.A.3 1934, 69 F.2d 294.
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B. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (1983) (Signing of Pleading, Motions, and
Other Papers; Sanctions)
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented
by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his
individual name, whose address shall be stated. A party who is not
represented by an attorney shall sign his pleading, motion, or other
paper and state his address. Except when otherwise specifically
provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or
accompanied by affidavit. The rule in equity that the averments of
an answer under oath must be overcome by the testimony of two
witnesses or of one witness sustained by corroborating circumstances
is abolished. The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a
certificate by him that he has read the pleading, motion, or other
paper; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief
formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is
warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed
for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary
delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. If a pleading,
motion, or other paper is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is
signed promptly after the omission is called to the attention of the
pleader or movant. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in
violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own
initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented
party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order
to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable
expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or
other paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE
1983 Amendment
Since its original promulgation, Rule 11 has provided for the
striking of pleadings and the imposition of disciplinary sanctions to
check abuses in the signing of pleadings. Its provisions have always
applied to motions and other papers by virtue of incorporation by
reference in Rule 7(b)(2). The amendment and the addition of Rule
7(b)(3) expressly confirms this applicability.
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Experience shows that in practice, Rule 11 has not been
effective in deterring abuses. See 6 Wright & Miller, Federal
Practice and Procedure: Civil § 1334 (1971). There has been
considerable confusion as to (1) the circumstances that should trigger
striking a pleading or motion or taking disciplinary action, (2) the
standard of conduct expected of attorneys who sign pleadings and
motions, and (3) the range of available and appropriate sanctions.
See Rodes, Ripple & Mooney, Sanctions Imposablefor Violations of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 64-65, Federal Judicial Center
(1981). The new language is intended to reduce the reluctance of
courts to impose sanctions, see Moore, Federal Practice 7.05, at
1547, by emphasizing the responsibilities of the attorney and reen-
forcing those obligations by the imposition of sanctions.
The amended rule attempts to deal with the problem by building
upon and expanding the equitable doctrine permitting the court to
award expenses, including attorney's fees, to a litigant whose oppo-
nent acts in bad faith in instituting or conducting litigation. See, e.g.,
Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752 (1980); Hall v. Cole,
412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973). Greater attention by the district courts to
pleading and motion abuses and the imposition of sanctions when
appropriate, should discourage dilatory or abusive tactics and help to
streamline the litigation process by lessening frivolous claims or de-
fenses.
The expanded nature of the lawyer's certification in the fifth
sentence of amended Rule 11 recognizes that the litigation process
may be abused for purposes other than delay. See, e.g., Browning
Debenture Holders' Committee v. DASA Corp., 560 F.2d 1078 (2d
Cir. 1977).
The words "good ground to support" the pleading in the original
rule were interpreted to have both factual and legal elements. See,
e.g., Heart Disease Research Foundation v. General Motors Corp.,
15 Fed.R.Serv.2d 1517, 1519 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). They have been re-
placed by a standard of conduct that is more focused.
The new language stresses the need for some prefiling inquiry
into both the facts and the law to satisfy the affirmative duty imposed
by the rule. The standard is one of reasonableness under the circum-
stances. See Kinee v. Abraham Lincoln Fed. Say. & Loan Ass 'n, 365
F. Supp. 975 (E.D. Pa. 1973). This standard is more stringent than
the original good-faith formula and thus it is expected that a greater
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range of circumstances will trigger its violation. See Nemeroff v.
Abelson, 620 F.2d 339 (2d Cir. 1980).
The rule is not intended to chill an attorney's enthusiasm or
creativity in pursuing factual or legal theories. The court is expected
to avoid using the wisdom of hindsight and should test the signer's
conduct by inquiring what was reasonable to believe at the time the
pleading, motion, or other paper was submitted. Thus, what consti-
tutes a reasonable inquiry may depend on such factors as how much
time for investigation was available to the signer; whether he had to
rely on a client for information as to the facts underlying the plead-
ing, motion, or other paper; whether the pleading, motion, or other
paper was based on a plausible view of the law; or whether he de-
pended on forwarding counsel or another member of the bar.
The rule does not require a party or an attorney to disclose privi-
leged communications or work product in order to show that the
signing of the pleading, motion, or other paper is substantially justi-
fied. The provisions of Rule 26(c), including appropriate orders after
in-camera inspection by the court, remain available to protect a party
claiming privilege or work product protection.
Amended Rule 11 continues to apply to anyone who signs a
pleading, motion, or other paper. Although the standard is the same
for unrepresented parties, who are obliged themselves to sign the
pleadings, the court has sufficient discretion to take account of the
special circumstances that often arise in pro se situations. See
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972).
The provision in the original rule for striking pleadings and mo-
tions as sham and false has been deleted. The passage has rarely
been utilized, and decisions thereunder have tended to confuse the
issue of attorney honesty with the merits of the action. See generally
Risinger, Honesty in Pleading and its Enforcement: Some "Strik-
ing" Problems with Fed.R.Civ.P. 11, 61 Minn. L. Rev. 1 (1976).
Motions under this provision generally present issues better dealt
with under Rules 8, 12, or 56. See Murchison v. Kirby, 27 F.R.D. 14
(S.D.N.Y. 1961); 5 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Proce-
dure: Civil § 1334 (1969).
The former reference to the inclusion of scandalous or indecent
matter, which is itself strong indication that an improper purpose un-
derlies the pleading, motion, or other paper, also has been deleted as
unnecessary. Such matter may be stricken under Rule 12(f) as well
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as dealt with under the more general language of amended Rule 11.
The text of the amended rule seeks to dispel apprehensions that
efforts to obtain enforcement will be fruitless by insuring that the
rule will be applied when properly invoked. The word "sanctions" in
the caption, for example, stresses a deterrent orientation in dealing
with improper pleadings, motions or other papers. This corresponds
to the approach in imposing sanctions for discovery abuses. See Na-
tional Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, 427 U.S. 639
(1976) (per curiam). And the words "shall impose" in the last sen-
tence focus the court's attention on the need to impose sanctions for
pleading and motion abuses. The court, however, retains the neces-
sary flexibility to deal appropriately with violations of the rule. It
has discretion to tailor sanctions to the particular facts of the case,
with which it should be well acquainted.
The reference in the former text to wilfulness as a prerequisite to
disciplinary action has been deleted. However, in considering the
nature and severity of the sanctions to be imposed, the court should
take account of the state of the attorney's or party's actual or pre-
sumed knowledge when the pleading or other paper was signed.
Thus, for example, when a party is not represented by counsel, the
absence of legal advice is an appropriate factor to be considered.
Courts currently appear to believe they may impose sanctions on
their own motion. See North American Trading Corp. v. Zale Corp.,
73 F.R.D. 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). Authority to do so has been made
explicit in order to overcome the traditional reluctance of courts to
intervene unless requested by one of the parties. The detection and
punishment of a violation of the signing requirement, encouraged by
the amended rule, is part of the court's responsibility for securing the
system's effective operation.
If the duty imposed by the rule is violated, the court should have
the discretion to impose sanctions on either the attorney, the party the
signing attorney represents, or both, or on an unrepresented party
who signed the pleading, and the new rule so provides. Although
Rule 11 has been silent on the point, courts have claimed the power
to impose sanctions on an attorney personally, either by imposing
costs or employing the contempt technique. See 5 Wright & Miller,
Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 1334 (1969); 2A Moore,
Federal Practice 11.02, at 2104 n. 8. This power has been used in-
frequently. The amended rule should eliminate any doubt as to the
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propriety of assessing sanctions against the attorney.
Even though it is the attorney whose signature violates the rule,
it may be appropriate under the circumstances of the case to impose a
sanction on the client. See Browning Debenture Holders' Committee
v. DASA Corp., supra. This modification brings Rule 11 in line with
practice under Rule 37, which allows sanctions for abuses during
discovery to be imposed upon the party, the attorney, or both.
A party seeking sanctions should give notice to the court and the
offending party promptly upon discovering a basis for doing so. The
time when sanctions are to be imposed rests in the discretion of the
trial judge. However, it is anticipated that in the case of pleadings,
the sanctions issue under Rule 11 normally will be determined at the
end of the litigation, and in the case of motions, at the time when the
motion is decided or shortly thereafter. The procedure obviously
must comport with due process requirements. The particular format
to be followed should depend on the circumstances of the situation
and the severity of the sanction under consideration. In many situa-
tions the judge's participation in the proceedings provides him with
full knowledge of the relevant facts and little further inquiry will be
necessary.
To assure that the efficiencies achieved through more effective
operation of the pleading regimen will not be offset by the cost of
satellite litigation over the imposition of sanctions, the court must
limit, to the extent possible, the scope of sanction proceedings to the
record. Thus, discovery should be conducted only by leave of the
court, and then only in extraordinary circumstances.
Although the encompassing reference to "other papers" in new
Rule 11 literally includes discovery papers, the certification require-
ment in that context is governed by proposed new Rule 26(g). Dis-
covery motions, however, fall within the ambit of Rule 11.
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C. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (1987)(Signing of Pleading, Motions, and
Other Papers; Sanctions)
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented
by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in the
attorney's individual name, whose address shall be stated. A party
who is not represented by an attorney shall sign the party's pleading,
motion, or other paper and state the party's address. Except when
otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not
be verified or accompanied by affidavit. The rule in equity that the
averments of an answer under oath must be overcome by the
testimony of two witnesses or of one witness sustained by
corroborating circumstances is abolished. The signature of an
attorney or party constitutes a certificate by the signer that the signer
has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of the
signer's knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable
inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or
a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of
existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose,
such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase
in the cost of litigation. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is not
signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the
omission is called to the attention of the pleader or movant. If a
pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the
court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the
person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate
sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other party or
parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of




The amendments are technical. No substantive change is
intended.
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D. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (1993) (Signing of Pleadings, Motions, and
Other Papers; Representations to Court; Sanctions)
(a) Signature. Every pleading, written motion, and other paper
shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney's
individual name, or, if the party is not represented by an attorney,
shall be signed by the party. Each paper shall state the signer's
address and telephone number, if any. Except when otherwise
specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be
verified or accompanied by affidavit. An unsigned paper shall be
stricken unless omission of the signature is corrected promptly after
being called to the attention of attorney or party.
(b) Representations to Court. By presenting to the court
(whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating) a
pleading, written motion, or other paper, an attorney or
unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person's
knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry
reasonable under the circumstances,-
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as
to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the
cost of litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are
warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the
establishment of new law;
(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have
evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have
evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further
investigation or discovery; and
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the
evidence or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably based on a
lack of information or belief.
(c) Sanctions. If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to
respond, the court determines that subdivision (b) has been violated,
the court may, subject to the conditions stated below, impose an
appropriate sanction upon the attorneys, law firms, or parties that
have violated subdivision (b) or are responsible for the violation.
(1) How Initiated.
(A) By Motion. A motion for sanctions under this rule shall be
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made separately from other motions or requests and shall describe
the specific conduct alleged to violate subdivision (b). It shall be
served as provided in Rule 5, but shall not be filed with or presented
to the court unless, within 21 days after service of the motion (or
such other period as the court may prescribe), the challenged paper,
claim, defense, contention, allegation, or denial is not withdrawn or
appropriately corrected. If warranted, the court may award to the
party prevailing on the motion the reasonable expenses and
attorney's fees incurred in presenting or opposing the motion.
Absent exceptional circumstances, a law firm shall be held jointly
responsible for violations committed by its partners, associates, and
employees.
(B) On Court's Initiative. On its own initiative, the court may
enter an order describing the specific conduct that appears to violate
subdivision (b) and directing an attorney, law firm, or party to show
cause why it has not violated subdivision (b) with respect thereto.
(2) Nature of Sanction; Limitations. A sanction imposed for
violation of this rule shall be limited to what is sufficient to deter
repetition of such conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly
situated. Subject to the limitations in subparagraphs (A) and (B), the
sanction may consist of, or include, directives of a nonmonetary
nature, an order to pay a penalty into court, or, if imposed on motion
and warranted for effective deterrence, an order directing payment to
the movant of some or all of the reasonable attorneys' fees and other
expenses incurred as a direct result of the violation.
(A) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded against a
represented party for a violation of subdivision (b)(2).
(B) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded on the court's
initiative unless the court issues its order to show cause before a
voluntary dismissal or settlement of the claims made by or against
the party which is, or whose attorneys are, to be sanctioned.
(3) Order. When imposing sanctions, the court shall describe
the conduct determined to constitute a violation of this rule and
explain the basis for the sanction imposed.
(d) Inapplicability to Discovery. Subdivisions (a) through (c)
of this rule do not apply to disclosures and discovery requests,
responses, objections, and motions that are subject to the provisions
of Rules 26 through 37.
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ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE
1993 Amendments
PURPOSE OF REVISION. This revision is intended to remedy
problems that have arisen in the interpretation and application of the
1983 revision of the rule. For empirical examination of experience
under the 1983 rule, see, e.g., New York State Bar Committee on
Federal Courts, Sanctions and Attorneys' Fees (1987); T. Willging,
The Rule 11 Sanctioning Process (1989); American Judicature
Society, Report of the Third Circuit Task Force on Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 11 (S. Burbank ed., 1989); E. Wiggins, T. Willging,
and D. Stienstra, Report on Rule 11 (Federal Judicial Center 1991).
For book-length analyses of the case law, see G. Joseph, Sanctions:
The Federal Law of Litigation Abuse (1989); G. Solovy, The Federal
Law of Sanctions (1991); G. Vairo, Rule 11 Sanctions: Case Law
Perspectives and Preventative Measures (1991).
The rule retains the principle that attorneys and pro se litigants
have an obligation to the court to refrain from conduct that frustrates
the aims of Rule 1. The revision broadens the scope of this
obligation, but places greater constraints on the imposition of
sanctions and should reduce the number of motions for sanctions
presented to the court. New subdivision (d) removes from the ambit
of this rule all discovery requests, responses, objections, and motions
subject to the provisions of Rule 26 through 37.
Subdivision (a). Retained in this subdivision are the provisions
requiring signatures on pleadings, written motions, and other papers.
Unsigned papers are to be received by the Clerk, but then are to be
stricken if the omission of the signature is not corrected promptly
after being called to the attention of the attorney or pro se litigant.
Correction can be made by signing the paper on file or by submitting
a duplicate that contains the signature. A court may require by local
rule that papers contain additional identifying information regarding
the parties or attorneys, such as telephone numbers to facilitate
facsimile transmissions, though, as for omission of a signature, the
paper should not be rejected for failure to provide such information.
The sentence in the former rule relating to the effect of answers
under oath is no longer needed and has been eliminated. The
provision in the former rule that signing a paper constitutes a
certificate that it has been read by the signer also has been eliminated
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as unnecessary. The obligations imposed under subdivision
(b) obviously require that a pleading, written motion, or other paper
be read before it is filed or submitted to the court.
Subdivisions (b) and (c). The subdivisions restate the
provisions requiring attorneys and pro se litigants to conduct a
reasonable inquiry into the law and facts before signing pleadings,
written motions, and other documents, and prescribing sanctions for
violation of these obligations. The revision in part expands the
responsibilities of litigants to the court, while providing greater
constraints and flexibility in dealing with infractions of the rule. The
rule continues to require litigants to "stop-and-think" before initially
making legal or factual contentions. It also, however, emphasizes
the duty of candor by subjecting litigants to potential sanctions for
insisting upon a position after it is no longer tenable and by generally
providing protection against sanctions if they withdraw or correct
contentions after a potential violation is called to their attention.
The rule applies only to assertions contained in papers filed with
or submitted to the court. It does not cover matters arising for the
first time during oral presentations to the court, when counsel may
make statements that would not have been made if there had been
more time for study and reflection. However, a litigant's obligations
with respect to the contents of these papers are not measured solely
as of the time they are filed with or submitted to the court, but
include reaffirming to the court and advocating positions contained
in those pleadings and motions after learning that they cease to have
any merit. For example, an attorney who during a pretrial
conference insists on a claim or defense should be viewed as
"presenting to the court" that contention and would be subject to the
obligations of subdivision (b) measured as of that time. Similarly, if
after a notice of removal is filed, a party urges in federal court the
allegations of a pleading filed in state court (whether as claims,
defenses, or in disputes regarding removal or remand), it would be
viewed as "presenting"--and hence certifying to the district court
under Rule 11-those allegations.
The certification with respect to allegations and other factual
contentions is revised in recognition that sometimes a litigant may
have good reason to believe that a fact is true or false but may need
discovery, formal or informal, from opposing parties or third persons
to gather and confirm the evidentiary basis for the allegation.
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Tolerance of factual contentions in initial pleadings by plaintiffs or
defendants when specifically identified as made on information and
belief does not relieve litigants from the obligation to conduct an
appropriate investigation into the facts that is reasonable under the
circumstances; it is not a license to join parties, make claims, or
present defenses without any factual basis or justification.
Moreover, if evidentiary support is not obtained after a reasonable
opportunity for further investigation or discovery, the party has a
duty under the rule not to persist with that contention. Subdivision
(b) does not require a formal amendment to pleadings for which
evidentiary support is not obtained, but rather calls upon a litigant
not thereafter to advocate such claims or defenses.
The certification is that there is (or likely will be) "evidentiary
support" for the allegation, not that the party will prevail with respect
to its contention regarding the fact. That summary judgment is
rendered against a party does not necessarily mean, for purposes of
this certification, that it had no evidentiary support for its position.
On the other hand, if a party has evidence with respect to a
contention that would suffice to defeat a motion for summary
judgment based thereon, it would have sufficient "evidentiary
support" for purposes of Rule 11.
Denials of factual contentions involve somewhat different
considerations. Often, of course, a denial is premised upon the
existence of evidence contradicting the alleged fact. At other times,
a denial is permissible because, after an appropriate investigation, a
party has no information concerning the matter or, indeed, has a
reasonable basis for doubting the credibility of the only evidence
relevant to the matter. A party should not deny an allegation it
knows to be true; but it is not required, simply because it lacks
contradictory evidence, to admit an allegation that it believes is not
true.
The changes in subdivisions (b)(3) and (b)(4) will serve to
equalize the burden of the rule upon plaintiffs and defendants, who
under Rule 8(b) are in effect allowed to deny allegations by stating
that from their initial investigation they lack sufficient information to
form a belief as to the truth of the allegation. If, after further
investigation or discovery, a denial is no longer warranted, the
defendant should not continue to insist on that denial. While
sometimes helpful, formal amendment of the pleadings to withdraw
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an allegation or denial is not required by subdivision (b).
Arguments for extensions, modifications, or reversals of existing
law or for creation of new law do not violate subdivision (b)(2)
provided they are "nonfrivolous." This establishes an objective
standard, intended to eliminate any "empty-head pure-heart"
justification for patently frivolous arguments. However, the extent to
which a litigant has researched the issues and found some support for
its theories even in minority opinions, in law review articles, or
through consultation with other attorneys should certainly be taken
into account in determining whether paragraph (2) has been violated.
Although arguments for a change of law are not required to be
specifically so identified, a contention that is so identified should be
viewed with greater tolerance under the rule.
The court has available a variety of possible sanctions to impose
for violations, such as striking the offending paper; issuing an
admonition, reprimand, or censure; requiring participation in
seminars or other educational programs; ordering a fine payable to
the court; referring the matter to disciplinary authorities (or, in the
case of government attorneys, to the Attorney General, Inspector
General, or agency head), etc. See Manual for Complex Litigation,
Second, § 42.3. The rule does not attempt to enumerate the factors a
court should consider in deciding whether to impose a sanction or
what sanctions would be appropriate under the circumstances; but,
for emphasis, it does specifically note that a sanction may be
nonmonetary as well as monetary. Whether the improper conduct
was willful, or negligent; whether it was part of a pattern of activity,
or an isolated event; whether it infected the entire pleading, or only
one particular count or defense; whether the person has engaged in
similar conduct in other litigation; whether it was intended to injure;
what effect it had on the litigation process in time or expense;
whether the responsible person is trained in the law; what amount,
given the financial resources of the responsible person, is needed to
deter that person from repetition in the same case; what amount is
needed to deter similar activity by other litigants: all of these may in
a particular case be proper considerations. The court has significant
discretion in determining what sanctions, if any, should be imposed
for a violation, subject to the principle that the sanctions should not
be more severe than reasonably necessary to deter repetition of the
conduct by the offending person or comparable conduct by similarly
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situated persons.
Since the purpose of Rule 11 sanctions is to deter rather than to
compensate, the rule provides that, if a monetary sanction is
imposed, it should ordinarily be paid into court as a penalty.
However, under unusual circumstances, particularly for (b)(1)
violations, deterrence may be ineffective unless the sanction not only
requires the person violating the rule to make a monetary payment,
but also directs that some or all of this payment be made to those
injured by the violation. Accordingly, the rule authorizes the court,
if requested in a motion and if so warranted, to award attorney's fees
to another party. Any such award to another party, however, should
not exceed the expenses and attorney's fees for the services directly
and unavoidably caused by the violation of the certification
requirement. If, for example, a wholly unsupportable count were
included in a multi-count complaint or counterclaim for the purpose
of needlessly increasing the cost of litigation to an impecunious
adversary, any award of expenses should be limited to those directly
caused by inclusion of the improper count, and not those resulting
from the filing of the complaint or answer itself. The award should
not provide compensation for services that could have been avoided
by an earlier disclosure of evidence or an earlier challenge to the
groundless claims or defenses. Moreover, partial reimbursement of
fees may constitute a sufficient deterrent with respect to violations by
persons having modest financial resources. In cases brought under
statutes providing for fees to be awarded to prevailing parties, the
court should not employ cost-shifting under this rule in a manner that
would be inconsistent with the standards that govern the statutory
award of fees, such as stated in Christiansburg Garment Co. v.
EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978).
The sanction should be imposed on the persons-whether
attorneys, law firms, or parties-who have violated the rule or who
may be determined to be responsible for the violation. The person
signing, filing, submitting, or advocating a document has a
nondelegable responsibility to the court, and in most situations
should be sanctioned for a violation. Absent exceptional
circumstances, a law firm is to be held also responsible when, as a
result of a motion under subdivision (c)(1)(A), one of its partners,
associates, or employees is determined to have violated the rule.
Since such a motion may be filed only if the offending paper is not
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withdrawn or corrected within 21 days after service of the motion, it
is appropriate that the law firm ordinarily be viewed as jointly
responsible under established principles of agency. This provision is
designed to remove the restrictions of the former rule. Cf Pavelic &
LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 493 U.S. 120 (1989) (1983
version of Rule 11 does not permit sanctions against law firm of
attorney signing groundless complaint).
The revision permits the court to consider whether other
attorneys in the firm, co-counsel, other law firms, or the party itself
should be held accountable for their part in causing a violation.
When appropriate, the court can make an additional inquiry in order
to determine whether the sanctions should be imposed on such
persons, firms, or parties either in addition to or, in unusual
circumstances, instead of the person actually making the presentation
to the court. For example, such an inquiry may be appropriate in
cases involving governmental agencies or other institutional parties
that frequently impose substantial restrictions on the discretion of
individual attorneys employed by it.
Sanctions that involve monetary awards (such as a fine or an
award of attorney's fees) may not be imposed on a represented party
for violations of subdivision (b)(2), involving frivolous contentions
of law. Monetary responsibility for such violations is more properly
placed solely on the party's attorneys. With this limitation, the rule
should not be subject to attack under the Rules Enabling Act. See
Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131 (1992); Business Guides, Inc. v.
Chromatic Communications Enter. Inc., 498 U.S. 533 (1991). This
restriction does not limit the court's power to impose sanctions.
Remedial orders may have collateral financial consequences upon a
party, such as dismissal of a claim, preclusion of a defense, or
preparation of amended pleadings.
Explicit provision is made for litigants to be provided notice of
the alleged violation and an opportunity to respond before sanctions
are imposed. Whether the matter should be decided solely on the
basis of written submissions or should be scheduled for oral
argument (or, indeed, for evidentiary presentation) will depend on
the circumstances. If the court imposes a sanction, it must, unless
waived, indicate its reasons in a written order or on the record; the
court should not ordinarily have to explain its denial of a motion for
sanctions. Whether a violation has occurred and what sanctions, if
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any, to impose for a violation are matters committed to the discretion
of the trial court; accordingly, as under current law, the standard for
appellate review of these decisions will be for abuse of discretion.
See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384 (1990) (noting,
however, that an abuse would be established if the court based its
ruling on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous as-
sessment of the evidence).
The revision leaves for resolution on a case-by-case basis,
considering the particular circumstances involved, the question as to
when a motion for violation of Rule 11 should be served and when, if
filed, it should be decided. Ordinarily the motion should be served
promptly after the inappropriate paper is filed, and, if delayed too
long, may be viewed as untimely. In other circumstances, it should
not be served until the other party has had a reasonable opportunity
for discovery. Given the "safe harbor" provisions discussed below, a
party cannot delay serving its Rule 11 motion until conclusion of the
case (or judicial rejection of the offending contention).
Rule 11 motions should not be made or threatened for minor,
inconsequential violations of the standards prescribed by subdivision
(b). They should not be employed as a discovery device or to test the
legal sufficiency or efficacy of allegations in the pleadings; other
motions are available for those purposes. Nor should Rule 11
motions be prepared to emphasize the merits of a party's position, to
exact an unjust settlement, to intimidate an adversary into
withdrawing contentions that are fairly debatable, to increase the
costs of litigation, to create a conflict of interest between attorney
and client, or to seek disclosure of matters otherwise protected by the
attorney-client privilege or the work-product doctrine. As under the
prior rule, the court may defer its ruling (or its decision as to the
identity of the persons to be sanctioned) until final resolution of the
case in order to avoid immediate conflicts of interest and to reduce
the disruption created if a disclosure of attorney-client
communications is needed to determine whether a violation occurred
or to identify the person responsible for the violation.
The rule provides that requests for sanctions must be made as a
separate motion, i.e., not simply included as an additional prayer for
relief contained in another motion. The motion for sanctions is not,
however, to be filed until at least 21 days (or such other period as the
court may set) after being served. If, during this period, the alleged
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violation is corrected, as by withdrawing (whether formally or
informally) some allegations or contentions, the motion should not
be filed with the court. These provisions are intended to provide a
type of "safe harbor" against motions under Rule 11 in that a party
will not be subject to sanctions on the basis of another party's motion
unless, after receiving the motion, it refuses to withdraw that position
or to acknowledge candidly that it does not currently have evidence
to support a specified allegation. Under the former rule, parties were
sometimes reluctant to abandon a questionable contention lest that be
viewed as evidence of a violation of Rule 11; under the revision, the
timely withdrawal of a contention will protect a party against a
motion for sanctions.
To stress the seriousness of a motion for sanctions and to define
precisely the conduct claimed to violate the rule, the revision
provides that the "safe harbor" period begins to run only upon
service of the motion. In most cases, however, counsel should be
expected to give informal notice to the other party, whether in person
or by a telephone call or letter, of a potential violation before
proceeding to prepare and serve a Rule 11 motion.
As under former Rule 11, the filing of a motion for sanctions is
itself subject to the requirements of the rule and can lead to
sanctions. However, service of a cross motion under Rule 11 should
rarely be needed since under the revision the court may award to the
person who prevails on a motion under Rule I11-whether the
movant or the target of the motion-reasonable expenses, including
attorney's fees, incurred in presenting or opposing the motion.
The power of the court to act on its own initiative is retained, but
with the condition that this be done through a show cause order.
This procedure provides the person with notice and an opportunity to
respond. The revision provides that a monetary sanction imposed
after a court-initiated show cause order be limited to a penalty
payable to the court and that it be imposed only if the show cause
order is issued before any voluntary dismissal or an agreement of the
parties to settle the claims made by or against the litigant. Parties
settling a case should not be subsequently faced with an unexpected
order from the court leading to monetary sanctions that might have
affected their willingness to settle or voluntarily dismiss a case.
Since show cause orders will ordinarily be issued only in situations
that are akin to a contempt of court, the rule does not provide a "safe
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harbor" to a litigant for withdrawing a claim, defense, etc., after a
show cause order has been issued on the court's own initiative. Such
corrective action, however, should be taken into account in deciding
what-if any-sanction to impose if, after consideration of the
litigant's response, the court concludes that a violation has occurred.
SUBDIVISION (D). Rules 26(g) and 37 establish certification
standards and sanctions that apply to discovery disclosures, requests,
responses, objections, and motions. It is appropriate that Rules 26
through 37, which are specially designed for the discovery process,
govern such documents and conduct rather than the more general
provisions of Rule 11. Subdivision (d) has been added to accomplish
this result.
Rule 11 is not the exclusive source for control of improper
presentations of claims, defenses, or contentions. It does not
supplant statutes permitting awards of attorney's fees to prevailing
parties or alter the principles governing such awards. It does not
inhibit the court in punishing for contempt, in exercising its inherent
powers, or in imposing sanctions, awarding expenses, or directing
remedial action authorized under other rules or under 28 U.S.C. §
1927. See Chambers v. NASCO, _ U.S. __ (1991). Chambers
cautions, however, against reliance upon inherent powers if
appropriate sanctions can be imposed under provisions such as Rule
11, and the procedures specified in Rule 11-notice, opportunity to
respond, and findings-should ordinarily be employed when
imposing a sanction under the court's inherent powers. Finally, it
should be noted that Rule 11 does not preclude a party from initiating
an independent action for malicious prosecution or abuse of process.
